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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-DENYING SOCIAL SECURITY
"MOTHER'S

INSURANCE BENEFITS" TO FATHERS VIOLATES EQUAL PRO-

TECTION COMPONENT OF FIFTH AMENDMENT

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.-

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
Paula Polatschek worked as a teacher for five years prior to marry-

ing Stephen Wiesenfeld in 1970. She continued teaching thereafter; her
earnings were the couple's principal source of support., Throughout
her employment, maximum social security contributions were deducted
from her salary. On June 5, 1972, Paula died in childbirth leaving
Stephen with sole responsibility for the care of their infant son, Jason
Paul. Shortly after Paula's death, Stephen applied for survivor's benefits for his son and himself under separate provisions of the Federal
Social Security Act.2 Although Jason's application was approved,
Stephen was denied benefits under section 402(g), which provides sur3
vivor's benefits only to mothers.
4
Stephen brought suit in a three-judge federal district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. He contended that section 402(g), by
making an impermissible gender-based classification, contravened
the equal protection guarantee 5 of the Constitution. The three-judge
court granted summary judgment to Stephen, declaring that section
402(g) unconstitutionally discriminated against women such as Paula
who are principal breadwinners for their families, "as well as against

1. Stephen worked as a self-employed consultant, having completed his education
before the marriage. Paula's yearly earnings were in the $10,000 range, while Stephen's
fluctuated around $2,500. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225, 1229 n.4 (1975).
2. The section of the Social Security Act relevant to Jason is 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970),
which provides benefits for minor dependent children of an individual who dies fully or
currently insured, regardless of the gender of the deceased parent. Stephen sought benefits
4
under 42 U.S.C. § 02(g) (1970). Headed "Mother's insurance benefits," it provides in
pertinent part:
(1) The widow . . . of an individual who died a fully or currently insured individual, if such widow . . . (E) at the time of filing such application has in her
care a child of such individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit . . . shall ...
be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit ....
3. See note 2 supra.
4. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
5. Since § 402(g) is federal legislation, the ruling constitutional clause for an equal
protection challenge is the fifth amendment. The Wiesenfeld Court noted:
"[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does
forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'"
...This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always
been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
95 S. Ct. at 1228 n.2 (citations omitted).
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men and children who have lost their wives and mothers
"6....
6Reading previous Supreme Court decisions as including gender-based classifications among those labeled "inherently suspect," the court found
that the alleged governmental interests could not survive the close
7
judicial scrutiny necessitated by such "suspect" classifications.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, without dissent, affirmed that section 402(g) was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection
component of fifth amendment due process," but declined to rest its
decision upon, or even address, the lower court's ruling that gender is
an "inherently suspect" classification. Without clearly indicating what
standards of scrutiny were being applied, the Court held that the statute
discriminated against female wage earners by affording their survivors
less protection than that afforded the survivors of male wage earnersY
The Court found that the statute's purpose was not, as the government
contended, to ameliorate economic discrimination against women attempting to provide for themselves. Rather, the Court found, the
legislative intent was to permit widowed mothers to devote themselves
to the care of children by electing not to work. 10 Viewing the statute
from this benefit-of-the-child vantage point, the Court found the sex
of the sole surviving parent irrelevant and the gender-based distinction
irrational and therefore unconstitutional."
Historically, the Court has used a two-tiered standard to resolve
equal protection challenges to statutory classifications. 12 Strict judicial
scrutiny of legislation is triggered by a classification that is "inherently
suspect' ' 1 3 or one that restricts a "fundamental right.'

4

When strict

6. 367 F. Supp. at 991.
7. Id. at 990-91.
8. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225, 1236 (1975).
9. Id. at 1232.
10. Id. at 1235.
11. Id. at 1235-36.
12. For the first comprehensive examination of these traditional standards see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969), which uses the
terms "restrained review" and "active review." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of
Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive
Classifications,62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974); Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifica.
tions Under the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1973); Note, The Decline
and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REv. 1489 (1972).
13. The Court has been extremely selective as to what classifications it will term
"suspect." The only classifications consistently so labeled have been race, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and
national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
14. Only certain interests have been classified as "fundamental" by the Court. See
Gunther, supra note 12, at 8-9.
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scrutiny is invoked, the government must show a "compelling" or
"overriding" interest to justify its statutory classification. 15 Classifications that are neither suspect nor affect fundamental rights have generally invoked only minimal scrutiny. The government then is required to offer only a "reasonable" or "rational" basis for the legislation. 16 These polar standards, though analytical in theory, have been
conclusory in effect. The Court, when applying minimal scrutiny, has
upheld legislation having any conceivable basis; when applying strict
17
scrutiny, the Court has struck the legislation.
The earliest gender-based classifications were upheld under the
minimal scrutiny test with its concomitant deference to legislative
action.' However, in 1971, a unanimous Court in Reed v. Reed invalidated for the first time state legislation that rested on a genderbased classification.19 The language of the decision did not betray a
break with the rational basis test,20 but the Court's process of identifying the alleged governmental interest implied a stricter form of scrutiny. The only legislative objective found was administrative convenience, and the Court concluded that a sex classification was an
unreasonable method of furthering that objective. 21 By thus invalidating a statute under the rational basis test, the Court broke its pattern of
22
according the two-tiered test a conclusory effect.
15. In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), the Court noted:
The state interest required has been characterized as "overriding," [McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)]; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); "compelling," Graham v. Richardson, [403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971)]; "important," Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), or "substantial," ibid. We attribute no particular significance to these variations in diction.
413 U.S. at 722 n.9. See also Nowak, supra note 12, at 1074.
16. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); REA v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See also Nowak, supra note 12, at 1074.
17. Gunther, supra note 12, at 8; Nowak, supra note 12, at 1074. But see note 22
infra as to the development of an intermediate standard of review.
18. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (Florida statute exempting women
from jury duty unless they specifically desired to serve); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (Michigan statute prohibiting licensing of females as bartenders); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (Oregon statute prohibiting female employment in any
factory in excess of 10 hours per day).
19. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Idaho statute at issue in Reed required that preference
be given to males when several persons seeking to administer an estate were otherwise
equally entitled to be chosen.
20. "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' " Id. at 76, quoting
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
21. 404 U.S. at 76.
22. Some commentators see in Reed and other cases the beginnings of a new, intermediate "rational scrutiny" test. See Gunther, supra note 12, at 21. Professor Gunther
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Almost two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,3 eight Justices
found a gender-based statute to be violative of the equal protection
clause. Four of the Justices2 4 would have included among "inherently
suspect" classifications those based on gender, indicating the basis for
such a move to be implicit in Reed. 25 Three Justices rejected such a
reading of Reed and declined to label gender a "suspect" classification. 26
The eighth Justice stated only that the legislation was invalid under
Reed. 7 Although the decision in Frontiero strengthened the notion
that stricter standards are to be used in gender classification challenges,
the lack of a clear majority left the question of appropriate future
28
standards unclear.
Later pronouncements of the Supreme Court dealing with genderbased classifications and equal protection challenges29 introduced a new
examined six Burger Court cases in which the equal protection issue was central but
which dealt with neither suspect classifications nor fundamental rights. From these cases
he hypothesized a model of "modest interventionism" or "intermediate standard of review" or "rational scrutiny": "In all of the cases, the Court was . . . less inclined to
tolerate substantial over- and underinclusiveness in deference to legislative flexibility." Id.
at 33. See also Nowak, supra note 12, at 108.1 ("demonstrable basis" standard); Note, A
Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause, supra
note 12, at 158 ("near-suspect" test); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, supra note 12, at 1497 ("balancing" test). These commentators attribute the emergence of this new test to the Court's disgruntlement with
the rigid two-tiered standard and its conclusory effect. Cf. San Antonio Ind. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Frontiero involved a federal statute requiring military servicewomen to demonstrate affirmatively the dependency of their spouses in order to obtain
additional benefits, even though servicemen's spouses were presumed dependent.
24. The plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas,
White and Marshall.
25. 411 U.S. at 682.
•26. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurred
but found it "unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding." Id. at 691-92. Justice
Powell urged the Court to reserve for the future any expansion of its rationale in light of
the pending ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment and the fact that the case could
be decided simply on the authority of Reed. Id.
27. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, citing Reed and agreeing only "that
the statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution."
411 U.S. at 691. Justice Rehnquist entered the only dissent.
28. See Erickson, Women and the Supreme Court: Anatomy is Destiny, 41 BROOK. L.
REv. 209 (1974); Comment, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: An Analysis of
Constitutional Approaches To Achieve Equal Rights for Women, 38 ALB. L. REv. 66
(1973); Note, Evaluating Sex Classifications: The Search for Standards, 23 CATH. U.L. REv.
599 (1974); 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 166 (1974).
29. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, two cases were handed down which
involved equal protection challenges but in which the Court declined to find a genderbased classification at all: Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (constitutionality of
excluding pregnancy from disability insurance benefits program); Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (constitutionality of mandatory maternity leaves). These
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factor. Kahn v. Shevin3 ° and Schlesinger v. Ballard-' sustained genderbased legislation, apparently because of the ameliorative purpose of
the statutes.32 However, neither case precisely identified the manner in
which the remedial nature of the statutory objective affected the Court's
analysis.3 3 It is difficult to discern whether the two cases involved a shift
to less stringent standards than those applied in Reed and Frontiero,
independent of the factor of remedial legislative purpose, or whether
the ameliorative factor was controlling.3 4 Nevertheless, the two cases
two cases indicate an additional pitfall for equal protection challenges of gender-based
classifications: if the Court is not persuaded a classification is in fact gender-based, it will
invoke neither Reed nor Frontierostandards.
30. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The Court there sustained, against a widower's equal protection challenge, a Florida statute which allowed a property tax exemption to widows
but not to widowers.
31. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). The Court there sustained, against a male Navy officer's
equal protection challenge, federal statutes which provided different promotion standards
for males and females.
32. Interpretation of Kahn is complicated by the fact that the case involved a tax
statute and by the Court's specific reference, 416 U.S. at 355, to the traditional leeway
given classifications drawn for tax purposes. Whether state revenue measures have always received such deference may be questioned. See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and
the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 617, 668 n.183 (1974); The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 133 n.34 (1974). In any case, the tax element
appears to have been only one factor in the Court's analysis. It was not emphasized again
in the opinion. See 14 WASHBURN L.J. 127, 129 n.16 (1975). In later opinions, Kahn has
been cited only in reference to the compensatory statutory scheme. See Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225, 1233 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975);
id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Ballard, in addition to the remedial statutory purpose, the Court recognized the
government's interest in maintaining effective leadership by an "up or out" promotional
philosophy. 419 U.S. at 510. However, in the dissenting opinion Justice Brennan argued
that this factor should not be relevant to ascertaining the validity of the statutory scheme.
Id. at 519-20.
33. Reed was interpreted in Kahn as requiring that a classification bear ".a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."' " 416 U.S. at 355, quoting Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), and F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920). The test applied in Ballard seems to be the traditional rational basis test, under
which the Court frequently will suggest a permissible rationale for legislation. "Congress
may thus quite rationally have believed that women line officers had less opportunity for
promotion than did their male counterparts .... " 419 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added). The
dissent criticized this approach: "While we have in the past exercised our imaginations
to conceive of possible rational justifications for statutory classifications . .. [n]ever, to my
knowledge, have we endeavored to sustain a statute upon a supposition . . . when the
asserted justification can be shown conclusively not to have underlain the classification in
any way." Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
34. The Court may have regarded the allegedly remedial purposes of the Kahn and
Ballard statutes as controlling, reasoning either that remedial legislation reflects a legitimate state interest sufficient to satisfy heightened scrutiny, or that remedial purposes
justify a relaxation of scrutiny. For discussion of the ways in which the remedial purpose
of the Kahn statute could have influenced the Court, see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,
supra note 32, at 134-35.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

were consistent in two respects: neither held that Frontiero meant
gender-based classifications would invoke strict judicial scrutiny, "
though the dissenters in both urged such a reading;3 6 and neither case
required a threshold determination of whether the statute's effect was
in fact remedial, likewise a source of consternation to the dissenters. 7
Stephen Wiesenfeld's challenge to the social security survivor's
benefits program seemed to offer a model case for clarification of the
Court's previous holdings, especially in light of the lower court's "inherently suspect" ruling 8 and the government's contention that the
challenged legislation had an ameliorative purpose. 39 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court's decision and rationale were not as enlightening as
they might have been on either the question of proper equal protection
standards for gender-based legislation or the significance of an allegedly ameliorative purpose. The Court declined to use, or even
acknowledge, the "inherently suspect" language of the Frontieroplurality. 40 However, it did give support to a premise that first emerged in
Ballard: the fatal attribute of gender-based legislation is the presence of

35. In Kahn, the majority opinion distinguished Frontiero simply as not having dealt
with ameliorative purposes. 416 U.S. at 355. In Ballard, the majority distinguished Reed
and Frontiera as cases premised on overbroad generalizations that could not be constitutionally legitimated by claims of administrative convenience. 419 U.S. at 506-08.
Neither the Kahn nor Ballard majority opinion mentioned the Frontiero plurality's insistence on applying strict scrutiny to gender-based classifications.
36. In Kahn, Justice Brennan's dissent urged that sex was a suspect classification and
that the statute was overinclusive. 416 U.S. at 357-58. Justice White dissented because he
felt that the statute was both overinclusive and underinclusive. 416 U.S. at 361. In Ballard, Justice Brennan's dissent reiterated his position that sex was a suspect classification.
419 U.S. at 511.
37. In Kahn, both dissents questioned whether the legislation in fact achieved its
ameliorative goal. 416 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 416 U.S. at 361 (White, J.,
dissenting). Dissenting in both Kahn and Ballard, Justice Brennan argued that a true
ameliorative purpose could meet the compelling standard, but he questioned the existence
of such a purpose in the Kahn and Ballard statutes. 416 U.S. at 358-60; 419 U.S. at 518.
See note 33 supra.
38. The three-judge court rejected the contention that Reed and Frontiero had
established a new intermediate equal protection test. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW,
367 F. Supp. 981, 988 (D.N.J. 1973). The court went on to read Fro'ntiero as having decided that gender is an "inherently suspect" classification. Id. at 990. In addition, though
Kahn and Ballard had not yet been decided by the Supreme Court, the lower court
scrutinized the possible remedial purpose of Congress' statute, and indicated that it
would survive a rational basis test but not the necessary strict scrutiny. Id. at 991.
39. The government contended that § 4 02(g) was designed to offset the adverse
economic situation of women by providing a widow with financial assistance. 95 S. Ct. at
1233.
40. This is significant since Justice Brennan, the author of Wiesenfeld, wrote the
plurality opinion in Frontieroand wrote dissents in Kahn and Ballard, see note 36 supra,
urging acceptance of strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications.
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"archaic and overbroad" generalizations based on impermissible as41
sumptions about gender.

Since the Wiesenfeld decision, the Court has again addressed the
problem of standards for gender-based classifications. In Stanton v.
Stanton,42 with reference to differing ages of majority for males and
females in the context of child support, the Court stated, "We find it
unnecessary in this case to decide whether a classification based on sex
is inherently suspect." ' 43 Citing Reed as controlling, the Court found
"nothing rational" in the sex distinction drawn by the majority age
statute, which imposed " 'criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute.' "4 As to the standards applied, the Stanton Court stated,
"[U]nder any test-compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in between-[the statute] in the context of child support, does not
survive an equal protection attack." 4' 5 While the Stanton decision did
not mention "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, it did find that
certain "old notions" about sex roles could not support the statute's
46

validity.

The approach taken in Wiesenfeld and Stanton lends credence to
the theory that, when precedent permits, the present Court will engage
in some form of intermediate scrutiny of statutory classifications rather
than extend the reach of the rigid two-tiered test. This approach
diminishes the likelihood of gender being classified as "suspect" within
the two-tiered standard. The Court seems to favor a case-by-case search
for situations to which it can apply any number of key phrases, such as
41.

In Ballard, the Court stated:
In both Reed and Frontiero the challenged classifications based on sex were premised on overbroad generalizations that could not be tolerated under the Constitution. In Reed, the assumption . . . was that men would generally be better
estate administrators than women. In Frontiero, the assumption . . . was that
female spouses of servicemen would normally be dependent upon their husbands,
while male spouses of servicewomen would not.
419 U.S. at 507. In Wiesenfeld, the Court identified "[a] virtually identical [to Frontiero]
'archaic and overbroad' generalization . . . that male workers' earnings are vital to the
support of their families, while the earnings of female wage-earners do not significantly
contribute to their families' support." 95 S. Ct. at 1231 (citations omitted).
42. 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975).
43. Id. at 1377.
44. Id. at 1378.
45. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added). Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
46. Id. at 1378. The "old notions" referred to included assumptions
"that generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its
essentials," ...
that "it is a salutary thing for him to get a good education and/or
training before he undertakes those responsibilities," . . . that "girls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before boys"; and that "they
generally tend to marry earlier," ....
95 S. Ct. at 1376 (citations omitted).
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"archaic and overbroad generalizations," drawn from its previous decisions. 4 1 When those phrases are not used, the Court appears content
merely to cite Reed or Frontieroas controlling rather than address the
8
question of appropriate equal protection standards.4
A side effect of the Court's present ad hoc approach is the more
subtle form of discrimination inherent in case-by-case inquiries into the
validity of gender distinctions; such inquires imply that courts-and
society-are inherently more tolerant of gender-based discrimination
than of discrimination based on other immutable traits, such as race.
One sure remedy for this unpalatable side effect would be consistent
judicial acknowledgement that classifications based on gender are
greatly disfavored-or "inherently suspect." 49 An even more effective
move toward elimination of this side effect would be the prohibition
of any classification based on gender, an idea embodied in the proposed
twenty-seventh amendment to the United States Constitution, the socalled ERA.50 Commentators have urged that prohibition of genderspecific statutes would not defeat the beneficial aspects of existing
gender-based legislation, since those aspects could be retained in sexneutral language. 51 In addition, the effect of the prohibitory language
47. In addition to "archaic and overbroad generalizations," discussed in note 41 supra,
the Court frequently cites such key Reed phrases as: "dissimilar treatment for men and
women who are . .. similarly situated," 404 U.S. at 77, quoted in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225, 1236 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 506, 507 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683, 688, 690 (1973); and "criteria wholly unrelated
to the objective of that statute," 404 U.S. at 76, quoted in Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S. Ct.
1373, 1378 (1975). A key Frontiero phrase is "solely . . .for administrative convenience,"
411 U.S. at 690, quoted in Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra at 506; Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351, 355 (1974).
48. For instance, the Court stated in Stanton, "Reed, we feel, is controlling here." 95
S. Ct. at 1377; stated in Wiesenfeld, "The gender-based distinction made by § 4 02(g) is
indistinguishable from that invalidated in [Frontiero] ....
" 95 S. Ct. at 1230; "[I]t is
indistinguishable from the classification held invalid in Frontiero,"id. at 1236; and stated
in Kahn, "This is not a case like Frontiero ...." 416 U.S. at 355.
49. Speaking to this problem in the context of a statute "so trivial" as to require the
use of "Miss" or "Mrs." for a woman to register to vote even though a man is not required to use any particular designation, one writer pointed out the inherent symbolism
of inferiority present in such legislation. He urged:
What is required is a special judicial sensitivity to the impact of legislative symbolism on any person's sense of first-class citizenship, on any person's sense of individuality, independence and self-worth. Doctrinally speaking, such sensitivity is
conveniently expressed in the notion that classification on the basis of sex is
"suspect," requireing [sic] justification by a compelling state interest.
Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism of Women's
Dependency, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 546, 552-53 (1974).
50. The substantive provision of the proposed amendment states: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex."
51. Sex-neutral classifications can be drawn by defining classes in terms of the func-
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of the ERA is attractive "because it would represent the highest de'5 2
gree of societal commitment to the ideal of legal sexual equality."
One objection voiced to the prohibitory language of the ERA is its
possible effect on legislation allegedly drawn for the purpose of rectifying past discrimination against women. It is clear from Kahn and
Ballard that the present Court's approach to this type of legislation is
solicitous. The Wiesenfeld Court clarified to some extent the judicial
attitude toward allegedly ameliorative legislation by rejecting the government's contention that section 402(g) was designed to offset the adverse economic situation of women by providing a widow with financial assistance. The Court cited with approval the principal of upholding such remedial legislation,5 3 but indicated, "[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying
a statutory scheme."5 4 The Court concluded that the statute was linked
directly to the care of minor children and was for their benefit. "Since
this purpose in no way is premised upon any special disadvantages of
women," the Court held, "it cannot serve to justify a gender-based
distinction which diminishes the protection afforded to women who do
work." 55
The Wiesenfeld opinion indicates that the Court, notwithstanding
its approach in Kahn and Ballard, will actively scrutinize allegedly
remedial gender-based legislation to ascertain its true purpose and
effect. However, the Court has clearly acknowledged its willingness to

tion a statute is intended to serve rather than relying on the misleading shorthand of
gender. The first article to urge such "functional analysis" was Murray & Eastwood, Jane
Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232, 240-41
(1965). For discussion and application of functional analysis, see Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 896-900 (1971); Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights
Amendment, 59 A.B.A.J. 1013 (1973), reprinted in 60 WOMEN LAW. J. 4 (1974); Note, Sex
Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1510-11 (1971).
52. Note, supra note 51, at 1511.
53. The Court cited Kahn and Ballard in support of the proposition that statutes
"'reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of
spousal loss upon that sex for [which] that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden'
can survive an equal protection attack." 95 S. Ct. at 1233, quoting Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
54. Id. Justice Brennan has consistently taken this position. See note 37 supra.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 1233. There were two concurring opinions. Justice Powell, joined by
the Chief Justice, identified a more narrow discrimination in the statute against female
wage earners. Id. at 1236. Justice Rehnquist saw no need to reach the issue of the
statute's purported discrimination against female workers since the statute was directed
solely to children's care and benefit. Id. at 1236-37.
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56
uphold truly ameliorative gender-specific legislation. This may signal
Court sanction for much of the existing gender-based legislation that
purports to favor rather than discriminate against women, including
other social security legislation that draws gender lines but bears no
relationship to children.5 7 Assuming that it is desirable to uphold
ameliorative legislation, it is crucial in such cases that the Court ensure
that the legislative purpose is in fact remedial. Statutes such as those in
Kahn and Ballard are not "affirmative action" statutes designed to help
women overcome past discrimination; they assume permanent inequality and suffer from the same archaic and overbroad generalizations that
the Court has stricken. 5
Additionally, one may question the desirability of sustaining even
those gender-based distinctions with a true ameliorative purpose. The
question is whether, if the ERA were passed, legislatures could use
gender-specific language in statutory attempts to make equality a prac59
tical reality. A related problem was presented in DeFunisv. Odegaard,
which dealt with benign racial admission policies in state universities.
In DeFunis,only Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, reached the
merits. 60 Since racial distinctions are not prohibited but are "suspect,"
a "compelling" reason for a racial distinction could theoretically validate the classification. Nonetheless, Justice Douglas' opinion urged the
adoption of race-neutral guidelines which would not be overinclusive

or underinclusive.

61

A landmark article on the ERA addressed the problem of genderspecific language:
[I]n a classification by sex all women or all men are included or excluded regardless of the extent to which some members of each sex
possess the relevant characteristics or perform the relevant function.
56. See note 53 supra. The dissenting opinions in Kahn and Ballard accepted the
principal that ameliorative purpose may save gender-specific legislation. See note 37 supra.
It is felt that even if the Court were to regard gender-based classification as "suspect,"
remedial gender-specific legislation would be upheld as having met the "compelling"
standard. See Brown, supra note 51, at 903-04.
57. For an analysis of other gender-based legislation in the social security area see
Grifliths, Sex Discrimination in Income Security Programs, 49 NOTR.E DAME LAW. 534
(1974); Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
277 (1971); Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 IND. L.J.
181 (1973).
58. See Erickson, supra note 28, at 221 n.52.
59. 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (constitutional challenge to racial preferences in law school
admissions dismissed as moot).
60. Id. at 320-44.
61. Id. at 334. But see Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); cf. Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of
Sexual Equality, 1972 SuP. CT. REv. 157, 166-73.
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Such a result is in direct conflict with the basic concern of our society with the individual, and with the rights of each individual to
develop his or her own potentiality. It negates all our values of individual self-fulfillment.62
Prohibition of gender-specific statutes need not eliminate governmental
attempts to help women who are disadvantaged. Sex-neutral classifications can be used to include members of the other sex who are similarly
disadvantaged.63 A statute providing special job training, for instance,
might be written so as to apply to anyone who has been absent from
the work force for a specified length of time, regardless of gender or
reason. Though difficult to fashion, only a statute affirmatively describing its purpose and those whom it is attempting to reach could be
sure to survive a challenge of underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness.
Absent adoption of the ERA, the Court will continue analyzing
gender classification challenges under the equal protection clause. It
appears that this approach will entail an initial inquiry as to whether
the purpose of the classification is remedial 64 and thus valid. Absent
such a finding, the Court will seek to distinguish the facts from its
previous cases, using the repertoire of such key phrases as "archaic and
overbroad generalizations" that those cases have generated. The Court's
unwillingness to provide a consistent rationale in cases like Wiesenfeld
and Stanton65 will render difficult a prediction of the constitutionality
of any gender-based classification. Forty years ago a commentary was
introduced with words that appear applicable today: "There is no
large and general question in law which has been left in a more
nebulous state than the question of how or to what extent the Federal
Constitution applies to women." 66
BARBARA CozAD BIDDLE
62. Brown, supra note 51, at 890.
63. See note 51 supra.
64. The Wiesenfeld opinion illustrates the importance to the Court of an initial
determination of remedial purpose. "Since the gender-based classification ... cannot be
explained as an attempt to provide for the special problems of women, it is indistinguishable from the classification held invalid in Frontiero."95 S. Ct. at 1236.
65. It appears that the goal of providing a clear standard for gender-based equal
protection challenges is subservient to a goal of unanimity. Wiesenfeld, though it had
two concurring opinions, had no dissents; Stanton had a lone dissent.
66. Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 BOSTON U.L. REV.
723 (1935).

